Abstract Social welfare orderings for different scales of individual utility measurement in distinct population subgroups are studied. In Khmelnitskaya and Weymark (2000) , employing the continuous version of Arrow's impossibility theorem, it was shown that for combinations of independent subgroups scales every corresponding social welfare ordering depends on the utilities of only one of the subgroups and is determined in accordance with the scale type proper to this dictatorial subgroup. In this article we introduce an alternative completely self-contained proof based on the study of the structure of level surfaces of a social welfare function which provides a real-valued representation of the social welfare ordering.
Introduction
In Arrow's famous impossibility theorem [1] , individual preferences are ordinally measurable and interpersonally noncomparable. Building on the seminal work of Sen [14] , there is now an extensive literature that investigates the implications for social decision-making of alternative assumptions concerning the measurability and interpersonal comparability of individual preferences. See, for example, Roberts [12] , [13] , d'Aspremont [3] , Yanovskaya [16] , [17] , Tsui and Weymark [15] , Bossert and Weymark [2] . These studies adapt mainly the welfarist approach to social choice and assume that only individual utilities matter for ranking a feasible set of social alternatives. In this case a social choice rule can be equivalently described in terms of a social welfare ordering -a social ordering of the admissible profiles of individual utilities (admissibility is understood as the satisfaction of several a priori appealing conditions), or in terms of a social welfare function -a function that represents a social welfare ordering and measures social welfare. Various assumptions concernAnna B. Khmelnitskaya SPb Institute for Economics and Mathematics Russian Academy of Sciences, 1 Tchaikovsky St., 191187, St.Petersburg, Russia, e-mail: a.khmelnitskaya@math.utwente.nl ing the measurability and interpersonal comparability of utility can be formalized by partitioning the set of feasible individual profiles and requiring the social welfare ordering to be constant over a cell of the partition. These studies show that under different measurability-comparability assumptions over individual utilities, i.e., in case when more democracy is adapted by the society, classes of nondictatorial social choice rules exist that satisfy all of Arrow's axioms (restated in terms of utility functions). In the aforecited publications the measurement scales of individual utilities are assumed to be of the same type across the entire society. An extension of this direction is a study of Arrovian social choice problems when individual utilities in disjoint subgroups of individuals are measured by different scale types, in other words, when separate subgroups of individuals admit different types of information. This situation is common in real decision making. A typical example is the partitioning of a human society into families which in turn consist of individuals. If an outsider is making the comparisons based on reports from individuals, it is reasonable to suppose that the kind of information available within and between families will be different in general. Indeed, the kinds of utility comparisons that can be made within a family cannot be made between people who do not know each other. A number of publications of the author (Khmelnitskaya [7] , [9] , Khmelnitskaya and Weymark [10] ) is devoted to study of Arrovian social choice problems with different scales of individual utility measurement in disjoint subgroups of individuals. In particular, in Khmelnitskaya and Weymark [10] it is shown that for ordinally or cardinally measurable subgroup utility when levels (and in the case of cardinal utilities, differences) of utility may or may not be interpersonally comparable while no utility comparisons between subgroups are possible, every continuous social welfare ordering that meets the weak Pareto principle depends on the utilities of only one of the subgroups and is determined in accordance with the scale type admissible to this dictatorial subgroup. Here we introduce another proof 1 for this statement restated in equivalent terms of a social welfare function. This proof is longer but completely self-contained different to the proof in [10] which is based on the employment of Bossert-Weymark [2] continuous analogue of both -Arrow's [1] impossibility theorem and Sen's [14] variant of Arrow's theorem for cardinally measurable utilities. Moreover, being based on the study of level surfaces of a social welfare function this proof provides also extra deep insight into the structure of possible interrelations between utilities of different individuals, while the proof in [10] allows only to state existence of a dictatorial subgroup.
In Section 2, we introduce basic definitions and notation and provide a formal statement of the problem. Section 3, provides the proof of the existence of a dictatorial subgroup for different combinations of mutually independent subgroup scales restated in terms of a social welfare function.
The framework
Consider a society consisting of a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of n ≥ 2 individuals. Let X be a finite set of at least three alternatives and let R denote the set of all possible preference orderings over X. The members of R are assumed to be weak orders, i.e., complete, reflexive and transitive binary relations. A social choice problem is a triple < X, N, {R i } i∈N >, where {R i } i∈N is a profile of individual preferences R i ∈ R, i ∈ N. To introduce measurability/comparability assumptions, we consider individual preferences represented as individual utilities, which may be interpreted as measurements of these preferences. So, let U be the set of all real-valued functions defined on X × N: for any u ∈ U, let u(x, i) denote the ith individual utility at the alternative x ∈ X. By a solution to a social choice problem we understand a social welfare functional, which is a mapping f : D → R where D ⊆ U is the domain of f . We assume f satisfies three welfarism axioms:
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. For any u, u ∈ D and A ⊆ X, if u(x, i) = u (x, i) for all x ∈ A and i ∈ N, then R : A = R : A where R = f (u) and R = f (u ).
(R : A denotes the restriction of R to A ⊆ X.)
Pareto Indifference. For any pair x, y ∈ X and for all u ∈ D, if u(x, i) = u(y, i) for all i ∈ N then xIy, where I denotes the indifference relation corresponding to R = f (u).
According to the welfarism theorem (D'Aspremont and Gevers [4] and Hammond [6] ), these three axioms ensure that only individual utilities matter when ranking social alternatives, so any vector u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) in the n-dimensional Euclidian space IR n can be considered as a profile of individual utilities for the society N; here u i is the utility of ith individual. From this perspective, a solution to a social choice problem can be regarded as a social welfare ordering (SWO), which is a weak order R * on IR n , the set of possible profiles of utility vectors. We assume that R * also satisfies the Weak Pareto property.
Weak Pareto (WP). For all u, v ∈ IR n , if u i > v i for all i ∈ N, then uP * v, where P * denotes the strict preference relation corresponding to R * .
The representation W is called a social welfare function (SWF). By WP, any SWF W is strictly increasing, i.e., for all u, v ∈ IR
We impose one more restriction on an SWO R * requiring R * to be continuous.
Continuity (C).
For all u ∈ IR n , the sets {v ∈ IR n | vR * u} and {v ∈ IR n | uR * v} are closed in IR n .
Continuity guarantees the existence of a continuous SWF [5] .
In the sequel by D n , we denote the diagonal of IR n . Let for any real c ∈ IR 1 , c N be a vector in IR n with all components equal to c and let g(c) = {u ∈ IR n |W (u) = c} be a c-level surface of the SWF W ; obviously, for every u ∈ IR n , g(W (u)) is a level surface of W containing u.
Remark 1 Because of continuity and strict monotonicity of all SWF, every level surface of any SWF meets a diagonal D n of IR n and moreover, this meet of set is a singleton. Hence, a natural scale for the meanings of SWF arises: since every SWF W is defined up to monotonic strictly increasing transforms, then without loss of generality it may be assumed that for any u ∈ IR n , W (u) = c, with c defined by the equality g(W (u)) ∩ D n = {c N }.
In the classic case of Arrow utilities were ordinally measurable and interpersonally non-comparable. More generally, within the SWO framework, the degree of measurability and comparability of utility inside the society N can be specified by a class of invariance transforms F, where each transform f ∈ F is a list of functions
where
In what follows we use the notation F N , when we need to specify to which particular society N the transforms of a class F apply; when no ambiguity appears, the index N will be omitted. Under conditions imposed, the Arrovian social choice problem in the informational environment introduced by an invariance class F can be equivalently described in terms of SWF W which 1) is a continuous real-valued function W :
2) is nondecreasing 2 , i.e., for all u, v ∈ IR n ,
3) is invariant under invariance transforms of class F, i.e., for any f ∈ F and for all u, v ∈ IR n ,
For an invariance class F to be a scale in the sense of the standard theory of measurement it has to satisfy the stronger condition of being a group (see Phanzagl [11] ). Different scale types for individual utility measurement have been examined in the literature (Roberts [13] , d'Aspremont [3] , Bossert and Weymark [2] ). Next we list the scales to be considered.
Ordinal Measurability (OM). f ∈ F iff f is a list of independent strictly increasing transforms f i , i ∈ N.
Ordinal Measurability and Full Comparability (OFC). f ∈ F iff f is a list of identical strictly increasing transforms, i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N, f i (t) = f 0 (t) where f 0 is a strictly increasing function independent of i.
Cardinal Measurability (CM). f ∈ F iff f is a list of independent strictly positive affine transforms, i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N, f i (t) = a i + b i t for some real a i and real b i > 0.
Cardinal Measurability and Unit Comparability (CUC). f ∈ F iff f is a list of strictly positive affine transforms with common unit, i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N, f i (t) = a i + bt for some real a i and b > 0 with b independent of i.
Cardinal Measurability and Full Comparability (CFC). f ∈ F iff f is a list of identical strictly positive affine transforms, i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N f i (t) = a + bt for some real a and b > 0, both independent of i.
The main concern of this paper is the situation when the entire society N is partitioned into m disjoint subgroups of individuals, i.e.,
It is assumed that a SWF W defined on IR n for different subgroups of variables indexed by N k , k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, may admit invariance transforms of different invariance classes F N k , which amounts to W being invariant under transforms of a class F N such that
In other words F N is the Cartesian product of the subgroup classes of transforms F N k . Notice that the class F N meets the condition (1). But, in general, even if all invariant classes F N k are scales, F N is not necessarily a scale: the condition of being a group may no longer hold. For example, a combination of CFC scales with a common zero is not a scale. In what follows we concentrate on mutually independent subgroup scales. The subgroup scales F N k , k = 1, . . . , m, are mutually independent, if for any distinct k 1 , k 2 ∈ {1, . . . , m}, for all i ∈ N k 1 and j ∈ N k 2 , there exist f i ∈ F N k 1 and f j ∈ F N k 2 such that f i (t) = a i + b i t with b i > 0 and f j (t) = a j + b j t with b j > 0, where a i = a j and b i = b j . Note that since OM and CM include the positive affine transforms, these classes are covered by the above definition as well. Mutual Independence preserves the group property and guarantees F N to be the direct product of groups F N k when each of the F N k is a group, i.e., it guarantees F N to be a scale, if all F N k are scales. It should also be stressed that Mutual Independence is a property of the set of subgroup classes of transforms {F N 1 , . . . , F N m }, not of individual transforms within these classes.
Introduce now some extra notation. By n k we denote the cardinality of N k . It is obvious that m k=1 n k = n. Let for any u ∈ IR n and all k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, u N k be a subvector of u that belongs to IR n k and is composed of components
is a coordinate subspace of IR n induced by coordinates with indices from N k , i.e.
For any u ∈ IR n and k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, let
be a hyperplane of dimension n k parallel to coordinate subspace IR N k and containing u. Obviously, IR
the diagonal of a coordinate subspace IR N k , and let L D be a subspace of IR n spanned by the diagonals D N k , k ∈{1, . . . , m}. It is easy to see that every u ∈ L D , u = {u i } i∈N , has the form u i = v k(i) , for some v = v(u) ∈ IR m and k(i) defined by the relation
It is easy to see that u c N k is an orthogonal projection of u on the hyperplane
We denote an orthogonal projection of the level surface g(c) to the hyperplane
For any two points u, u ∈ IR n , u = u , let l(u, u ) and r[u, u ) be respectively a straight line passing through both points, u and u , and a ray starting from u and passing through u ; moreover, by r(u, u ) = r[u, u )\{u} we denote an open ray without its origin.
As usual, IR n + = {u ∈ IR n |u i ≥ 0, i ∈ N, & u = 0} is the nonnegative orthant in IR n . For the mean value of a vector u ∈ IR n we use the standard notationū, i.e. u = ( n i=1 u i )/n. Following [2] , for any vector u ∈ IR n , the fan generated by u is
A subset Y of IR n is a fan, if it is a fan generated by some u ∈ IR n .
Existence of a dictatorial subgroup
Clearly, every continuous nondecreasing n-dimensional function that is determined only by variables with indices from one of the subgroups and that is invariant under invariance transforms proper to this subgroup of variables is a SWF. Below we study the situations for which such a form of a SWF is the only possible one, or equivalently, for which a dictatorial subgroup, i.e., a decisive coalition equal to one of the subgroups of individuals, must exist. The social ordering is then determined in accordance with the scale type of this dictatorial subgroup.
0 for all i = j, and let a continuous nondecreasing function W : IR n → IR 1 with respect to variables indexed by N k be invariant under one of scales OM, OFM, CM, CUC, or CFC. Moreover, the subgroup scales are assumed to be mutually independent. Then there exists a unique integer k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, such that for all u ∈ IR n , W has the form
i.e., W is determined only by variables indexed by N k , and besides is fully characterized by the scale type proper to this subset of variables.
Remark 2 Notice that any CFC transform at the same time is a transform of any of the OM, OFM, CM and CUC invariant classes. Hence, it is possible to simplify the statement of Theorem 1 by requiring only that the function W (u) with respect to variables indexed by N k , k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, be invariant under mutually independent CFC transforms.
Theorem 1 allows us to construct a SWF characterization for various combinations of OM, OFM, CM, CUC and CFC independent subgroup utility scales on the basis of well-known results for social choice problems with the same measurement scales of individual utilities for the entire society.
In terms of level surfaces, the statement of Theorem 1 means that for any function W (u), there exists a unique k ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that every level surface g(c) is parallel to the coordinate subspace IR N\N k . The latter is tantamount to
, for all u ∈ IR n . It is not difficult to see that for the proof of the last inclusion, it is sufficient to show that every meet of set g(W (u)) ∩ IR N k (u), k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, except one is a hyperplane of dimension n k . For different combinations of mutually independent OM, CM and CUC scales, the result may be easily obtained based on the admissibility of the transform f = {f i } i∈N :
Indeed, for all combinations of OM, CM and CUC scales, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, every meet of set g(W (u))∩IR N k (u) together with any two points contains the whole straight line passing through these points, and therefore has to be a hyperplane. So, for this case the proof of Theorem 1 is rather simple. However, if we append OFC and CFC scales, then the defined above transform f is inadmissible for all combinations of scales, and not every meet of set g(W (u))∩IR N k (u) is a hyperplane. To prove Theorem 1, first, we show that every level surface g(c) contains its own orthogonal projection g N k (c) on the hyperplane IR N k (c N ), k ∈{1, . . . , m}, which in turn coincides with the meet of set g(c) ∩ IR N k (c N ) (Lemma 1). Next, in terms of these projections we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a function W (u) to be fully determined only by variables indexed by some fixed subgroup N k (Lemma 2). And finally, we prove that this condition holds under the hypothesis of the theorem (Lemma 3 and Lemma 4). Lemma 1. Any level surface g(c) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m} contains its own orthogonal projection on the hyperplane IR N k (c N ), i.e.,
moreover, either dim g N k (c) = n k or dim g N k (c) = n k − 1 and
Proof. Fix some k ∈ {1, . . . , m}. To prove (3) it will suffice to show that for every
. Take an admissible transform f = {f i } i∈N :
. Therefore, every neighborhood of u c N\N k has a nonempty meet with g(c). Whence by continuity of W , u c N\N k ∈ g(c).
Because of continuity of W , there exists a neighborhood S of u c N\N k such that |W (u ) − a| < |c − a|/2, for all u ∈ S, wherefrom |W (u ) − c| > |c − a|/2, for every u ∈ S. Hence, W (u ) = c, for all u ∈ S. The obtained contradiction proves (3) .
From the definition of orthogonal projection it follows directly that
and
Combining the last inequalities together with the equality dim g(c) = n − 1, we obtain
From the definition of orthogonal projection it also follows that
From which together with (3) and (5), (4) follows immediately.
Remark 3 Lemma 1 remains true under a coarser partition of N into disjoint subgroups when a few subgroups N k , k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, may merge into one. It is worth noting that this remark concerns all subsequent propositions as well.
Remark 4 Due to the admissibility of the transform {f i (t) = a + t} i∈N for all real a, the level surfaces g(c) relevant to different c can be obtained from each other by parallel shifts along the diagonal D n . (This property was mentioned earlier in [13] ). Wherefrom together with (4) it follows that for all real c and c ,
i.e., all projections g N k (c) relevant to the same k and different c can be obtained from each other by parallel shifts along D n .
Since c N ∈ g(c) and because of the admissibility of the transform {y i (t)
Denote by H N k (c) the cylinder g N k (c) + IR N\N k .
Remark 6
As it was already noted in the proof of Lemma 1, for any real c and all
Lemma 2. A function W for any u ∈ IR n has the form
i.e. depends only on the variables u i with indices i ∈ N k , if and only if there exists real c such that dim g N k (c) = n k − 1.
Proof. I. Necessity. Clearly, for every real c
By hypothesis, for all u ∈ IR n and, in particular, for all
. Therefore and because of (4), the projection g N k (c), being a subset of the n kdimensional hyperplane IR N k (c N ), is characterized by the unique equality W (u N k ) = c in the intrinsic coordinates of IR N k (c N ), whence it follows that for every c, dim g N k (c) = n k − 1.
II. Sufficiency. From (6) for all real c and c ,
i.e., for all c = c, every meet of set
If we show that for every k ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that dim
do not meet each other and cover the whole IR N k (c N ), it will follow that cylinders H N k (c) relevant to different c do not meet and cover IR n . On the other hand, since W is defined on the entire IR n , for every u ∈ IR n , there exists a level surface of W containing u. Hence, because of (7) for every real c, g(c) = H N k (c), which is the same as for all u ∈ IR n , W (u) = W (u N k ). Thus, to complete the proof of sufficiency, it is enough to show that for every k ∈ {1, . . . , m} for which dim g N k (c) = n k − 1, the parallel shifts of
do not meet each other and cover IR N k (c N ). First, we show that for every k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the parallel shifts of g N k (c) along
For any u ∈ IR n the level surface g(W (u)) passes through u. Whence and because of Remark 1, every g(W (u)) is a cone with a top in {W (u)} N ∈ D n and all level surfaces may be obtained from each other by parallel shifts along D n . Therefore, through every point in any two-dimensional half-plane with a boundary D n , denoted in the sequel by IR 
may be considered as a projection of a cylinder To show that for every k ∈ {1, . . . , m} for which dim
do not meet, it suffices to show that every half-plane IR 2 ± (D N k (c)) contains a ray belonging to g N k (c) and solely one. Assume the contrary, and let at least two rays r 1 , (D N k (c) ). Then due to continuity of the level surface g(c) and continuity of the projection mapping Pr : IR n → IR N k (c N ), the piece of a half-plane IR 2 ± (D N k (c)) between rays r 1 and r 2 also belongs to g N k (c) as well, which is impossible since by hypothesis, dim g N k (c) = n k − 1.
Remark 7
The necessary and sufficient condition in Lemma 2 may be restated equivalently in terms of cylinders H N k (c). Indeed, the equality dim g N k (c) = n k − 1, for some k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, is tantamount to the equality
and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m},
and furthermore, if
Proof. To prove the first statement, assume that dim g N k (c) = n k − 1, for some k ∈ {1, . . . , m}. By (4) and (8) , for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m}
Similarly for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, k = k,
Prove now the second one. Assume the contrary that
Then because of (3), IR N\N k (c N ) ⊂ g(c), which is equivalent to W (u) = W (u N k ). Whence, by Lemma 2, dim g N k (c) = n k − 1, which contradicts to the hypothesis.
Next, from Lemma 1 and Remark 3 it follows that either dim g N\N k (c) = n − n k , or dim g N\N k (c) = n − n k − 1. If dim g N\N k (c) = n − n k − 1, then by the Remark 7, g(c) = H N\N k (c). Obviously,
whence by (4), g N k (c) = IR N k (c N ).
Further, if we suppose g N k (c) = IR N k (c N ) and repeat the latter arguments, then because of (3) and Lemma 2, we arrive at dim g N\N k (c) = n − n k − 1. Proof. From the first statement of Lemma 3, if dim g N k (c) = n k and g N k (c) = IR N k (c N ), then dim g N\N k (c) = n − n k . It follows that there exist a real e > 0 and two points u 1 ∈ g N k (c), u 2 ∈ g N\N k (c), such that u e 1 = u 1 + (e N k , 0 N\N k ) ∈ g N k (c) and u e 2 = u 2 + (0 N k , e N\N k ) ∈ g N\N k (c). Moreover, by Lemma 1 and Remark 3 , u 1 , u e 1 , u 2 , u e 2 ∈ g(c). Consider the admissible transform f = {f i } i∈N :
By (2), W (f u 1 ) = W (f u e 2 ). Then notice that f u 1 = u e 1 ∈ g(c). Hence, f u e 2 ∈ g(c). But f u e 2 = u 2 + e N , whence since u 2 ∈ g(c) and since all level surfaces g(c ) for different c can be obtained from each other by parallel shifts along D n , f u e 2 ∈ g(c + e). But for f u e 2 ∈ g(c), the latter is impossible.
Remark 9
From Remark 4 it follows that, if for some c and k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the statement of Lemma 3 or of Lemma 4 holds true, then for the same k it holds true for all c = c.
Proof of Theorem 1 From Corollary 1 and Lemma 4 it follows that for some k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, dim g N k (c) = n k − 1. Moreover, by the first statement of Lemma 3, this k is unique. Whence together with Lemma 2 we obtain the validity of Theorem 1.
